2014-03-30

Σε αρκετά κείµενα από την αρχαιότητα µέχρι σήµερα, στο µυαλό ορισµένων από εµάς, αλλά και σε διάφορες συζητήσεις µας έχουν εµφανιστεί και περιγραφεί κοινωνίες πολύ καλύτερες από αυτήν που ζούµε στο παϱόν. Σήµερα, µε την πρόοδο της επιστήµης και της τεχνολογίας, υπάρχει επιπλέον η δυνατότητα της λεπτοµερούς περιγραφής της λειτουργίας µιας τέτοιας εναλλακτικής κοινωνίας. Παρ΄ όλα αυτά, εξακολουθεί να µην έχει γίνει πράξη κανένα σηµείο της. ∆ιαφαίνεται, λοιπόν, ένα παϱάδοξο αφού από την µία πλευρά υπάρχει ένας άκρως επιθυµητός και εφικτός στόχος, ενώ από την άλλη πλευρά δεν έχει υλοποιηθεί καµία πτυχή του. Στο παρόν άρθρο, εντοπίζονται οι αιτίες του παράδοξου αυτού και προτείνεται µια διαδικασία µετάβασης από τον σηµερινό τρόπο ζωής σε έναν διαφορετικό, παρουσιάζοντας έτσι µια εφικτή και αποδοτική λύση στο πρόβληµα της µετάβασης σε µια καλύτερη κοινωνία.

2014-10-20

Συχνά ακούµε ϕράσεις όπως "δεν υπάρχουν νέες ιδέες πια" ή "δεν γίνονται σήµερα µεγάλα πράγµατα όπως παλιότερα" ή "απουσιάζουν σήµερα οι µεγάλες καινοτοµίες, απουσιάζουν οι µεγάλοι άντρες". Η αντίληψη ότι οι σηµερινές ιδέες υπολείπονται κατά πολύ των παλαιότερων διατρέχει όλους τους τοµείς της ζωής µας, από την τέχνη ως την επιστήµη και από την πολιτική ως τον αθλητισµό. Κι όµως, οι µεγάλες ιδέες είναι εδώ. Και οι άνθρωποι που τις αναπτύσσουν είναι εδώ.

the following correspond to a group: N is the number of individuals W is the time of period that can be considered as the base of our periodic phenomenon, e.g. W = ”a week”

Τα βασικά στοιχεία των ενεργειών είναι η γνώση, η σκέψη και η πράξη. Ορθή και ικανή για θεμιτά αποτελέσματα κρίνεται η ύπαρξη και των τριών στοιχείων και μάλιστα στη σειρά που προαναφέρθηκαν. Για μια ολοκληρωμένη ενέργεια χρειάζεται πρωτίστως η γνώση η οποία μπορεί να αποκτηθεί με το διάβασμα, την παρατήρηση, την εμπειρία και άλλα μέσα παθητικής στάσης, έπεται η σκέψη με στόχο την κατανόηση των αντικειμένων της γνώσης με τελικό στάδιο την πλήρη αφομοίωσή τους και τέλος η πράξη ως υλοποίηση αυτών που κατανοήθηκαν με απώτερο στάδιο την παραγωγή έργου.

An individual is a person, an animal, a machine, or an element of nature that can be considered distinct from its environment. A social system, or simply system, is a set of individuals. Each individual has needs which must be satisfied to preserve the individual in an acceptable level of existence. Each need is satisfied by goods, that are produced by individuals. A system is selfcontained if the individuals that constitute it use goods produced exclusively by them, while a system is introvert if the goods produced by its individuals are consumed only by them. In other words, at a self-contained system there are not imports of goods from outside the system, while at an introvert system there are not exports of goods to outside the system. A system is closed if it is both self-contained and introvert, otherwise it is open.

The present paper is an attempt to formulate a positive theory of motivation which will satisfy these theoretical demands and at the same time conform to the known facts, clinical and observational as well as experimental.

ONE REASON WHY THERE is so MUCH INTEREST in the diffusion of innovations is because getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious advantages, is often very difficult. There is a wide gap in many fields, between what is known and what is actually put into use. Many innovations require a lengthy period, often of some years, from the time when they become available to the time when they are widely adopted. Therefore, a common problem for many individuals and organizations is how to speed up the rate of diffusion of an innovation.

Political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom.

People remember information from two basic sources: that derived from external sources (obtained through perceptual processes) and that generated by internal processes such as reasoning, imagination, and thought. Of particular interest to us are the processes people use in deciding whether information initially had an external or an internal source, which we call "reality monitoring." We propose a working model of reality monitoring to account for both discrimination and confusion between memories for thoughts and memories for perceptions. Examples of questions the model addresses are, What types of information are more likely to be represented in memories of external events than in memories of internal events? What cues allow people to decide the origin of a memory? What is the nature of the decision processes involved? Which processes, and under what conditions, are likely to break down and lead to unreliable memory? What assumptions do individuals have about their memory for their thoughts compared to their memory for their perceptions? How accurate are these assumptions? We summarize some research that is encouraging as far as the tractability of some of these problems is concerned and that demonstrates the usefulness of the particular working model proposed here.

The notion of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

A life-long intellectual partnership between two major thinkers, so close that their most celebrated single texts were co-authored and their names are difficult to dissociate, is rare enough to rank as virtually a sport of history. There seem to be only two cases: in the 19th century, Marx and Engels, and in the 20th Horkheimer and Adorno. Might they be regarded as prefigurations of what in a post-bourgeois world would become less uncommon? Their patterns differed. Marx and Engels, born two years apart, were contemporaries; once their friendship was formed, collaboration between them never ceased. Adorno was eight years Horkheimer’s junior, and a close working relationship came much later, with many more vicissitudes: initial meeting in 1921, intermittent friction and exchange up to the mid-1930s, concord only in American exile from 1938 onwards, more pointedly distinct identities throughout. The general trajectory of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research is well known, as over time ‘critical theory’—originally Horkheimer’s code-word for Marxism—confined itself to the realms of philosophy, sociology and aesthetics; to all appearances completely detached from politics. Privately it was otherwise, as the exchange below makes clear. This unique document is the record, taken down by Gretel Adorno, of discussions over three weeks in the spring of 1956, with a view to the production of—as Adorno puts it—a contemporary version of The Communist Manifesto. In form it might be described, were jazz not anathema to Adorno, as a philosophical jam-session, in which the two thinkers improvise freely, often wildly, on central themes of their work—theory and practice, labour and leisure, domination and freedom—in a political register found nowhere else in their writing. Amid a careening flux of arguments, aphorisms and asides, in which the trenchant alternates with the reckless, the playful with the ingenuous, positions are swapped and contradictions unheeded, without any compulsion for consistency. In substance, each thinker reveals a different profile. Horkheimer, historically more politicized, was by now the more conservative, imbibing Time on China, if not yet to the point where he would commend the Kaiser for warning of the Yellow Peril. Though still blaming the West for what went wrong with the Russian Revolution, and rejecting any kind of reformism, his general outlook was now close to Kojève’s a decade later: ‘We can expect nothing more from mankind than a more or less worn-out version of the American system’. Adorno, more aesthetically minded, emerges paradoxically as the more radical: reminding Horkheimer of the need to oppose Adenauer, and envisaging their project as a ‘strictly Leninist manifesto’, even in a period when ‘the horror is that for the first time we live in a world in which we can no longer imagine a better one’.

Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been losely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. But the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and so its frequency. We need better understanding of how to promote these goods without incurring adverse side-effects on world peace.

Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been losely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. But the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and so its frequency. We need better understanding of how to promote these goods without incurring adverse side-effects on world peace.